Abstract. We introduce algebraic geometric techniques in secret sharing and in secure multi-party computation (MPC) in particular. The main result is a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) dened over a nite eld Fq, with the following properties.
Introduction
This paper introduces the use of algebraic geometric techniques in secret sharing and in secure multi-party computation (MPC) in particular. MPC concerns the problem of a network of players who wish to compute an agreed function on respective private inputs in a secure way, i.e., guaranteeing correctness of the result and privacy of their respective inputs, even if some players are corrupted by an adversary.
Let e t;n denote the t-threshold adversary structure on the players f1Y X X X Y ng, i.e., it consists of all subsets of size at most t. Similarly, let r;n denote the threshold access structure consisting of all subsets of size at least r. For a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) w on n players, let (w) denote the sets accepted by w, and let e(w) denote the sets rejected by w. Let F q be a nite eld, and let g be a smooth projective absolutely irreducible curve dened over F q , and let g denote its genus. The number of F q -rational points on g is denoted #g(F q ).
We show that for any integer n with 1`n`#g(F q ) and any integer t with 1 t`n 2g there exists an LSSS w over F q with the following properties.
1. It is an ideal scheme on n players; the secret as well as each share consists of a single eld element.
It is quasi-threshold (with a 2g gap). This means that e t;n & e(w) and
r;n & (w) where r = t + 1 + 2g. It it thus in particular a ramp scheme.
We also show how high information rate can be achieved.
3. It has strong multiplication [15] with respect to the e t;n adversary structure provided that t`1 3 n 4 3 g.
This is a specialized multi-linear algebraic property known to facilitate zeroerror multi-party multiplication, unconditionally secure against active corruptions (see [15, 14] ). See Section 2 for the denition. It is also known to linearize in general the problem of recovery of the secret in the presence of corrupted shares [10] .
4. Shamir's scheme, which requires n b q and which has strong multiplication for t`n 3 , is a special case of our scheme by taking g = 0. However, by taking g b 0 and by selecting suitable curves, q can be dramatically smaller than the number of players n, as elaborated below.
Consider the model of a synchronous network with pair-wise secure channels. It is a classical result due Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [1] and Chaum, Cr epeau and Damgaard [4] that ecient MPC unconditionally secure (with zero error probability [1] ) against an active adversary bound by the threshold condition that fewer than a 1/3-fraction of the players are corrupted is possible in this model. An active adversary is one who may arbitrarily inuence and coordinate the behavior of the corrupted parties. The actual protocols make intricate use of Shamir's scheme.
Cramer, Damgaard and Maurer [15] show how to \eciently bootstrap" MPC protocols from general LSSS, thereby providing means for dealing with general (i.e., \non-threshold") adversaries. The adversary structure capturing the resulting MPC's resilience is related to the access structure of the LSSS. Interestingly, these techniques will be used here for achieving security against a threshold adversary. Indeed, in the model we consider here, the properties of the proposed LSSS are for instance sucient for the construction of an ecient (additively homomorphic) veriable secret sharing scheme (VSS). 1 This is a fundamental primitive in MPC, as general MPC secure against an active adversary is essentially about performing secure arithmetic on VSS-ed secret values. The scheme is unconditionally secure (with zero error probability) against an active t-adversary. This is by requiring t`1 3 n 2 3 g: this renders the scheme n 2t-accepting, which is needed to enforce error-freeness of the VSS. The strong multiplication property is immaterial in this case. The number of eld elements exchanged is the same as in the VSS from [1] or as in later variations, except that the eld over which it is dened can be much smaller than the number of players n. Shamirbased solutions require n b q. The price to be paid is that that the corruption tolerance is decreased by an (arbitrarily) small (constant) fraction of n.
An LSSS per se is not known to be sucient for ecient MPC, even though, as said, additively homomorphic VSS as such can be constructed from it. This does of course enable secure computation of addition, or more generally, linear functionals. However, secure multiplication is only known to be possible if the underlying LSSS in addition satises certain multi-linear algebraic properties, such as the multiplication property or the strong multiplication property. In the particular \perfect, zero-error" MPC scenario considered here, the strong multiplication property is essential. It will enable the claimed MPC over small elds, just as with the VSS discussed above.
Note that there exists an ecient transformation that maps relevant LSSS to equivalent LSSS that additionally satisfy the multiplication property [15] , increasing the share size by only a multiplicative factor of two. However, it is important to note that no ecient transformation at all is known for the case of strong multiplication.
LSSS that satisfy the multiplication property rather than the strong multiplication property can in particular be used as basis for MPC secure against a passive adversary or against an active one but with non-zero yet negligible error probabilities. Moreover, if the model is augmented with a broadcast primitive, an active adversary can be tolerated who corrupts fewer than a 1/2-fraction of the players, at the cost of introducing non-zero yet negligible error probabilities [32] .
For VSS it is required that the underlying LSSS is n t-accepting and for secure multiplication the LSSS is required to satisfy the multiplication property. Using the LSSS introduced here, both are satised if t`1 2 n 2g. More details and extended results can be found in [16, 7] .
In general, LSSS with strong multiplication admit an algorithm to recover the secret in the presence of corrupted shares. This algorithm is ecient if the secret sharing scheme itself is ecient to begin with. This follows from the results in [10] where it is shown that strong multiplication linearizes this \decoding problem," by means of a generalization of ideas taken from the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. For completeness we include in this paper a description of the general procedure from [10] as it applies to our algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes, even though in the present case it also follows by ecient decoding algorithms for algebraic geometry codes.
The quasi-threshold property of our scheme is sucient for our purposes, but it is also unavoidable. Indeed, threshold linear secret sharing schemes are equivalent to maximum distance separable codes (MDS). For such codes it is well-known that q ! maxftY n t + 1g if 0`t`n 1, which gives for example a 2qa3 lower bound when t is approximately na3. Worse, the Main Conjecture for MDS codes implies q ! n 2. Since VSS in the scenario we consider here requires an LSSS that is t-rejecting and n 2t-accepting, the setting n = 3t + 1 would mean that the LSSS is required to be t-rejecting and t + 1-accepting. In other words, it would be a threshold scheme, and the MDS argument above applies. Similar reasoning applies to dierent scenarios of MPC.
Some remarks on ramp schemes are in order. An (Y )-ramp scheme is in some sense as a threshold secret sharing scheme. It is -rejecting (no information) and -accepting (full information). However, b + 1 is allowed. This means that for sets whose size is between and anything might happen, including partial information. Ramp schemes may have higher information rate than secret sharing schemes; the size of a secret may be larger than the size of a share. It seems that all known linear ramp schemes required relatively large elds of denition, just as ordinary threshold secret sharing schemes. So it seems that our results may also be viewed as bearing on the theory of ramp schemes per se. We also show how to achieve high information rate, see Section 4. Finally, we also indicate in this paper how general coding theory arguments combined with (extensions of) known relationships between coding and secret sharing allow for a discussion of the ramp schemes claimed above (neglecting strong multiplication) without explicit reference to the algebraic geometric framework.
Mathematically, our construction is inspired by Goppa's algebraic geometric error correcting codes [23] . In particular, shares are dened by evaluating a function on the points of a curve, where the function is chosen from an appropriate Riemann-Roch space. However, several issues that are immaterial for coding theory play a role in the present context and indeed inuence the denition, the analysis and the choice of parameters of the new scheme presented here. Shamir's scheme may be viewed as the genus 0 case.
Earlier work on secret sharing and secure computation that relies on techniques from algebraic number theory and/or algebraic geometry includes [17, 13, 12, 9] . Earlier applications of algebraic curves to other areas in information theoretically secure cryptography include those to authentication codes (see e.g. [2, 38, 26, 39] ), and cover-free families and broadcast exclusion [25] . In general, algebraic geometry plays an increasingly important role in combinatorics, theoretical computer science and applied mathematics.
Before quantifying the possible advantages and trade-os of the new scheme, note that trade-os between communication complexity and corruption tolerance have been studied before. Indeed, Franklin and Yung [19] have shown that with a lower but still linear (in n) corruption bound, the same computation can be performed on many dierent inputs for the price of one such computation in the standard, classical case. Recently [11] it has been shown that a single, standalone secure multiplication can be performed with linear instead of quadratic communication (in n). Nevertheless, these results rely in an essential way on secret sharing techniques over a eld of size at least n.
Let x q (g) denote the maximal number of F q -rational points on a genus g curve g dened over F q . The Hasse-Weil bound states that q + 1 2g p q x q (g) q + 1 + 2g p qX Note that if g is a plane curve then the bound becomes
p q x q (g) q + 1 + (d 1)(d 2) p qX However, curves in higher dimensional spaces can have many more points.
The theoretical upper bound is an additional 2g p q players compared to using Shamir's scheme in secure computation, while lowering the maximal tolerable number of corrupted players by an additive factor at most 4ga3.
Viewed from a dierent angle, and using the Garc a-Stichtenoth curves [21] , a family of non-plane curves with many rational points and celebrated for their optimal ratio between genus and number of rational points, one can achieve the following asymptotic bound. For each with 0``1 6 , there is a nite eld F q such that for innitely many n there exists a scheme with strong multiplication and with ( 1 3 ) ¡ n t`1 3 ¡ n. In particular all sets of size at least n 2t are accepted. This example is detailed at the end of this paper, together with other examples.
Note that there exists theoretically ecient constructions of the curves of Garc a and Stichtenoth. Ecient construction means here that one can also eciently work with the relevant Riemann-Roch spaces. There are a host of classes of curves with many rational points known from coding theory that allow for ecient construction. We do not further address computational issues here. This is deferred to the full version.
The results in this paper focus on application to error-free unconditionally secure MPC in the secure channels model, with synchronous communication and in the presence of an active adversary. The results can be adapted to other models of MPC or just to plain secret sharing or ramp schemes, e.g., in the context of secure and private storage. In ongoing work generalizations to higher dimensional varieties are studied [6] as well as the case of MPC in the broadcast model [7] .
Preliminaries
This section contains some basic denitions and conventions about linear secret sharing and about algebraic curves over nite elds, as well as some relevant facts. The denitions concerning linear secret sharing below are slight adaptations of denitions from [15] .
An adversary structure e on a nite player set is a collection of subsets of with the property that e H P e and e & e H implies e P e. An adversary structure is 3 if for all eY e H Y e HH P e it holds that e e H e HH is a proper subset of . e t;n is the adversary structure consisting of all sets e & of size at most t. The access structure r;n consists of all sets f & of size at least r.
A linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) w over F q on the player set is given by a positive integer e, a sequence 1 Y X X X Y n of subspaces of the e-dimensional F q -vector space F e q , and a non-zero vector u P F e q . Let A denote P iPA i , the F q -subspace spanned by all the i with i P e. The access structure (w) of w consists of all sets f & with u P B . We set u = (1Y 0Y X X X Y 0) P F e , without loss of generality. The structure e(w) consists of the sets e & with e T P (w).
An LSSS as dened here is essentially a monotone span program [24] . An LSSS w is said to reject a given adversary structure e dened on if e & e(w). If f is a non-empty set with f & , then w B denotes the LSSS on the player set f given by restricting to those i with i P f. An ideal LSSS is one in which all i have dimension 1 and where for each i there is f in (w) that is minimal with respect to inclusion and for which i P f.
Secret sharing based on an LSSS works in essence as follows. Suppose that bases for the i 's are xed. Let s P F q be a \secret value." Choose a random linear map 0 : F e q 3 F q subject to 0(u) = s, and give 0 jVi to player i, i.e., the action of 0 on each of the chosen basis vectors of i . It holds that f0 jVi g iPA determines the secret s uniquely if and only if e P (w), and f0 jVi g iPA gives no information about s in all other cases, i.e., when e P e(w). Note that by basic linear algebra e P e(w) if and only if there exists a linear map : F e q 3 F q such that vanishes on A , i.e., jV A 0, but (u) = 1. u P . w has the strong multiplication property with respect to an adversary structure e (on ) if the following holds.
1. w rejects the adversary structure e.
2. For all f & with f = n e for some e P e, c w B has multiplication. It is not hard to see that strong multiplication implies that if eY e H P e, then n e e H P (w). Thus, in particular, in order for an LSSS to have strong multiplication with respect to an adversary structure e, it must be so that e is 3.
2
It can be shown that for all nite elds F q and for all 3 adversary structures e there is an LSSS with strong multiplication. In general, however, the dimension may be very large. The standard example for an ideal LSSS is Shamir's scheme.
If t`na3 in this scheme, it has strong multiplication with respect to e t;n . Note that (w) = t+1;n and that it requires q b n.
In analogy to Shamir's scheme, in the case of an ideal LSSS it is sucient to prove that \for each set e P e, the pair-wise local products of two vectors of shares belonging to the set f = n e jointly uniquely determine the product of the secrets." This is then by linear combination as a consequence. These facts are used implicitly when arguing about strong multiplication in the sequel.
As an aside we mention that it is known [15] how to eciently enforce the multiplication property on all relevant LSSS; the dimension only goes up by a multiplicative factor 2. In the much more demanding case of strong multiplication the general question whether it can always be eciently enforced on all relevant LSSS is completely open.
As indicated earlier in this paper, using the techniques from [15] one can construct ecient MPC protocols for the MPC scenario we consider in this paper from an LSSS that satises strong multiplication with respect to a 3 adversary structure e. Note that in the present paper we are using a slightly generalized denition of the adversary structure of an LSSS and what it means to satisfy strong multiplication with respect to it: in [15] the adversary structure is always e(w), and strong multiplication is always dened with respect to that structure only. In the present paper we have rened these notions, and allow for the denition to apply to an adversary structure e contained in e(w). This does not make any essential dierence. 3 We now give a quick overview of basics on algebraic geometry. In Section 3 we briey point out how part of our result (i.e, neglecting strong multiplication) can be appreciated if one accepts some general results about algebraic geometric error correcting codes and (an extension of) a known connection between codes and secret sharing.
Let g be a smooth, projective, absolutely irreducible curve dened over F q , and let g denote the genus of g. Let [Y ] that is irreducible in F q [Y ] . The ane part of the curve is dened as the set of points P F 2 q such that p ( ) = 0. By taking its projective closure, which amounts to introducing an extra variable, homogenizing the polynomial 2 In [10] it is shown how strong multiplication enables ecient error correction. 3 For zero-error VSS from LSSS the condition that e is 3 and that for all eY e 0 P e, n e e 0 P (w) must be explicitly made. In case of strong multiplication this condition is implied, as pointed out. Since g is smooth at each point P g by assumption, the local ring y P (g) of functions f P F q (g) that are well-dened at (equivalently, the ones that do not have a pole at ) is a discrete valuation ring. Thus, at each P g, there exists t P F q (g) (a uniformizing parameter) such that t( ) = 0 and each f P y P (g) can be uniquely written as f = u ¡ t P (f ) . Here, u P y P (g) is a unit (i.e.,u( ) T = 0), and # P (f) is a non-negative integer. This valuation # P extends to all of F q (g), by dening # P (f) = # P (1af) if f has a pole at .
A divisor is a formal sum P P PC m p ¡ ( ) with integer coecients m p taken over all points of the curve g. Divisors are required to have nite support, i.e., they are zero except possibly at nitely many points. The divisor of f P F q (g) is dened as div(f) = P P PC # P (f) ¡ ( ). It holds that deg div(f) = 0. The degree degh of a divisor h is the sum P P PC m P P Z of its coecients m P . The Riemann-Roch space associated with a divisor h is dened as v(h) = ff P F q (g)jdiv(f) + h ! 0g f0g. This is an F q -vector space. The (partial) ordering \!" refers to the comparison of integer vectors and declaring one larger than the other if this holds coordinate-wise. Its dimension is denoted (h). This dimension is equal to 0 if degh`0. The Riemann-Roch Theorem is concerned with the dimensions of those spaces. It says that (h) (u h) = degh+1 g. Here u is a canonical divisor. These are the divisors u of degree 2g 2 and (u) = g. It follows immediately that (h) = degh + 1 g if degh is large enough, i.e., at least 2g 1. This consequence suces for the purposes in this paper.
An F q -rational point on g is one whose projective coordinates can be chosen in F q . Rational point shall mean F q -rational point. Note that non-plane curves can in principle harbor many more rational points than plane curves.
The divisors on g dened over F q (or F q -rational divisors) are those that are invariant under the Galois group Gal(F q aF q ). This includes the divisors whose support consists of rational points only. In this paper all divisors are rational. If h is rational, then v(h) admits a basis dened over F q . In this paper v(h) is tacitly restricted to the F q -part of v, i.e., the F q -linear span of such basis, or equivalently, the subspace of v(h) xed under Gal(F q aF q ). This has q`( D) elements. As a consequence of this convention, if P g is rational and if f P v(h), then f( ) P F q .
For introductions to algebraic geometry, see for instance [20, 27] , or or textbooks that place special emphasis on curves over F q such as [37, 36] . For an accessible, high level overview of the technicalities sketched above see for instance [28] .
Main Result
As before, let g be a smooth projective absolutely irreducible curve dened over F q , and let g denote its genus.
Let
Y 0 Y 1 Y X X X Y n be any distinct rational points on g, possibly exhausting all rational points of g. Let t be any xed integer with 1 t`n 2g. The divisor h is dened as h = (2g + t) ¡ ()X Thus, it has support and degree 2g + t. 4 The claimed LSSS w works as follows. Let s P F q be a secret value. The construction above may be viewed as a combination of Goppa's algebraicgeometry error correcting codes [23] and Massey's construction of linear secret sharing schemes from error-correcting codes [29, 30] . The latter result allows to study privacy and reconstruction in terms of properties of the underlying linear codes and their duals. More precisely, one observes that their respective minimum distances imply bounds on the parameters of a ramp scheme. This can be combined with known properties of algebraic-geometric codes to obtain bounds on privacy and reconstruction as we give below. Nevertheless, a slight generalization of the results of Massey is needed to be able to analyze our high information rate ramp scheme from Section 4. We have, however, chosen a selfcontained presentation whose details can all be directly understood from the corollary of Riemann-Roch we stated before. Moreover, in order to prove the strong multiplication property as we do it is essential to be able to address the explicit structure of our secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 1 Let i be a divisor on g that is dened over F q , and suppose that (i) b 0. Then each f P v(i) is uniquely determined by evaluations of f on any degi + 1 rational points on g outside the support of i.
Proof. This is a standard argument. First note that for each f P v(i) and for each rational point on the curve outside the support of i the value f( ) is well-dened, as f certainly has no poles there. This follows from the denition of v(i). For completeness we show how strong multiplication linearizes the problem of recovering the secret in the presence of corrupted shared. It is a special case of the more general technique given in [10] . But also note that known techniques for decoding algebraic-geometry codes apply here. In any case, assume t`(n 4g)a3. Let u = (f( 1 )Y X X X Y f( n )) be a share vector for the secret s = f( 0 ), with f P v(h). Let e P F n q be a vector of Hamming-weight at most t, i.e., its number of nonzero coordinates is at most t. Some nal remarks about the basic construction are in order. Often one may re-dene h so that one extra player is supported. Indeed, by using the Weak Approximation Theorem (see [36] ) an equivalent h H can be found whose support really lies in an extension eld, thereby making all rational points available for players. There is an alternative approach to \winning points" in which all of the points in the support of any (positive divisor) h can be used as extra players. ones takes 2g + t + 1 instead of 2g + t as the degree of h, then the secrets may in fact be chosen arbitrarily from F`q instead of F q . The share size doesn't change. Thus it is a (tY 2g + t + Y n)-ramp scheme where each share is in F q , but where the secret can be chosen in F`q. Strong multiplication and ecient error recovery can also be appropriately carried over to this variation.
Below concrete numerical examples are given, using well-known classes of curves. The genus 0 case of our construction collapses to Shamir's scheme. As a rst example with an advantage compared to known technique, consider elliptic curves,
i.e., g = 1. It is well-known that x q (1) = q+1+2 p qY unless a certain condition on q and the characteristic of p of F q holds, 5 in which case this maximum number is just one less. Compared to using Shamir's scheme in secure computation, our scheme supports, over the same nite eld F q , an additional 2 p q 1 players.
The maximal level of corruption tolerance is decreased by at most an additive factor of 2 (just 1 if the number of players n is such that n 1 is not divisible by 3).
Here is one example based on higher genus curves. Consider the Hermitian curves p q+1 + p q+1 = p q+1 over F q , where q is a square. These well-known curves hit the Hasse-Weil upper bound. The genus of such curves is equal to 1 2 (q p q), and their number of F q -rational points is q p q + 1.
For example, working over F 64 , more than 500 players are supported and more than 130 corruptions are tolerated. In comparison, in Shamir's scheme q would be greater than 500 (instead of 64), but almost 40 more corruptions could be tolerated.
Finally, the well-known (non-plane) curves of Garc a and Stichtenoth [21] from coding theory, prove useful here as well. Let q be a square. Then there is a family of curves fg m g mPZ>0 dened over F q such that #g m (F q ) ! (q p q) p q 6 , there is a nite eld F q such that for innitely many n there exists a scheme with strong multiplication and with ( 1 3 ) ¡ n t`1 3 ¡ n. Note that in particular all sets of size at least n 2t are accepted.
Note that there exists theoretically ecient constructions of the curves of Garc a and Stichtenoth. Ecient construction means here that one can also eciently work with the relevant Riemann-Roch spaces. There are a host of classes of curves with many rational points known from coding theory that allow for ecient construction. We do not further address computational issues here. This is deferred to future work. See also a table with known values of x q (g), see [22] . 5 p divides 2 p q and Fq is an extension of degree at least 3 over Fp
